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The Restatement of Gay(?)
Courtney G. Joslin† & Lawrence C. Levine††
INTRODUCTION
This Symposium—the “Restatement Of . . .” conference—
brings together scholars with expertise in a range of subjectmatter fields to consider existing Restatements and whether
new Restatements are in order. The specific question we ask is
whether there should be a Restatement or other type of American
Law Institute (ALI) publication1 devoted to legal issues affecting
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people; or, to put
it in a less cumbersome but more crude fashion, whether the ALI
should produce The Restatement of Gay.2
† Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I thank Afra Afsharipour,
Susan Frelich Appleton, David Horton, Melissa Murray, Dennis Ventry, and Rose
Cuison Villazor for helpful feedback. I am grateful to the UC Davis School of Law,
particularly Dean Kevin Johnson and Associate Dean Vikram Amar, for providing
generous financial support for this project. Finally, I thank the editors of the Brooklyn
Law Review for their careful editorial assistance.
†† Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I
greatly appreciate the able research assistance of Pacific McGeorge students Vignesh
Ganapathy, Danielle Lenth, and Vallerye Mosquera. I am also grateful to Professors
Anita Bernstein, Julie Davies, Michael Green, and Brian Landsberg for their helpful
input. Finally, my thanks to Brooklyn Law School, the Brooklyn Law Review, the ALI,
and Professor Anita Bernstein for inviting us to participate in this Symposium.
1 Although Restatements are the most well-known of the ALI’s publications,
the ALI publishes a number of different types of publications. Restatements were the
“ALI’s first endeavor.” ALI Overview, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
about.instituteprojects (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). Although this description is
certainly open to debate, the ALI describes Restatements as documents that seek to
“tell judges and lawyers what the law [is].” Id. In addition to these more familiar
Restatements, the ALI also publishes a number of uniform or model statutory formulations,
including the Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Code of Evidence, and the Model Penal
Code. Most recently, the ALI has produced a number of “Principles of the Law.” In contrast to
Restatements, which often seek to a greater degree to “describ[e] the law as it is,” Principles
forthrightly seek to “express[ ] the law as it should be, which may or may not reflect the law as
it is.” Publications Catalog, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.faq
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
2 Because the word “gay” is used primarily to refer to men, many lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender people prefer more inclusive phrases to “gay rights” or the
“gay community.” See, e.g., American Defamation League, Unheard Voices: Stories of
LGBT History 5 (2011), http://archive.adl.org/education/curriculum_connections/
unheard-voices/pdfs/entire_unit.pdf. While we share these concerns, we use the term
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After thinking about the question independently and
then discussing it together, we both answered the question in
the negative. But, as explained in more detail below, that does
not mean we think the ALI need not address LGBT issues. In
fact, we think just the opposite is true. Given the influence that
ALI publications have on the development of the law, we think
it is critically important for the ALI to engage with and address
the law as it applies or should apply to LGBT people. But we
think that this engagement should be in the context of the
relevant subject-matter publications, rather than in the form of
a separate, stand-alone publication dedicated to LGBT issues.
Part I of this article develops why we think it is critical
for the ALI to more comprehensively consider and address
LGBT issues. Part II explains why we advocate an inclusive
rather than an exclusive approach for such consideration. We
discuss an ALI publication—the Model Penal Code—to help
explain why we support such an approach.
Part III provides some concrete examples of how this
inclusive approach could be implemented. We start by offering
some guidance as to what types of provisions are most likely to
be in need of reconsideration and possible revision. Such
provisions include those that turn in some way on the existence
of a legally recognized relationship. As we explain, these
provisions exclude most LGBT couples. Moreover, these
provisions are increasingly out-of-step with the demographics
of families in the United States and have a disproportionately
negative effect on lower-income families and families of color.
Other provisions that may be in need of reconsideration are
those that relate to discriminatory conduct.3 To provide more
clarity about what we advocate, we offer one example of an ALI
publication that already does a good job of incorporating LGBT
issues—the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution—as
well as an example of an ALI publication that needs further
revision—the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
I.

IMPORTANCE OF THE ALI

Without question, we both believe it is critically
important for the ALI to engage with LGBT issues in its
publications. As other scholars have noted, “‘authorship’ of the
“gay” here in the proposed title because it is less cumbersome than the alternatives. In
the body of the piece, we use the more inclusive term “LGBT.”
3 See infra Part III.D.
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American Law Institute serves a strong legitimizing function.”4
ALI publications are the collaborative product of leading scholars,
lawyers, and judges. Indeed, ALI projects are unusual in that
they bring together experts from both practice and academia. As a
result, many (although not all) of the ALI’s publications have had
tremendous influence on the development of the law in states,
spanning the geographical and political spectrum.
The degree of influence varies by publication and subject
matter. Some ALI publications have had a profound impact on
the development of the law. The Model Penal Code, the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), and the Restatements of Torts arguably
fall into this category.5 The UCC, for example, has been adopted
and implemented at least in part by all 50 states.6 “In the realm
of substantive criminal law, by far the most significant
development has been the completion of the American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code[.]”7 And the Restatement of Torts is
an example of a non-Model Code publication that has heavily
influenced the development of state law.8
4 Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute
Has Done for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 87, 88-89
(2001); see also Michael D. Green & Olivier Moréteau, Restating Tort Law: The
American and European Styles, 3 J. EUR. TORT LAW 281, 285 (2012) (“By all accounts,
the ALI has had enormous success in influencing the development of the common law
in the US.”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION 1, 2 n.5 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter RECONCEIVING
THE FAMILY] (“It is difficult to overstate the degree of the ALI’s influence. As of March
1, 2004, state and federal courts have cited the Restatements 161,486 times.”); Carl E.
Schneider, Afterword: Elite Principles: The ALI Proposals and the Politics of Law
Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra, at 489, 491 (“The ALI has wielded
influence beyond the fantasies of its founders. The Model Penal Code and the
Restatements are as close to binding precedent as nongovernmental authority can be,
and they are only part of the Institute’s agenda.”).
5 Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at Its Future, 12
GREEN BAG 2D 255, 258 (2009) (“Perhaps the most influential has been the Model Penal
Code adopted by the Institute in 1962, for which Herbert Wechsler was the reporter before
he became the Institute’s director. The strong influence of this project and its wide
acceptability helped to modernize the penal codes of many of the States[.]”).
6 Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
103, 146-47 (2008) (“The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a leading example.
Originally promulgated in 1952 and revised periodically since then, some version of the
UCC is in force in all fifty states.”).
7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1986);
see also Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical Antecedents, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 521, 538 (1988) (“[T]he influence of the Model Penal Code has been so
great that it has now permeated and transformed the substantive criminal law of this
country.”); Richard G. Singer, Foreword, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 519 (1988) (referring to
the MPC as “one of the most historic documents in the history of the criminal law”).
8 Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 285 (“The three torts Restatements
(the most popular and influential of all of the Restatements that the ALI has published)
has been cited an estimated 70,000 times since the first one was published in 1934.”);
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 932 (2009) (“The classic
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Other publications arguably have had less influence.9 For
example, some commentators claim that the ALI’s Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution (Principles) has had little impact
on the development of the law.10 Even allegedly less persuasive
publications like the Principles, however, heavily influence the
scholarly discussions and the way the subject matter is taught in
law schools.11 For example, although no state has “adopted” the
Principles, they are extensively discussed and analyzed in family
law textbooks12 and have been the subject of scores of law review
articles.13 Over time, this discussion likely will influence the
development of the law, even if it is not directly attributed to
the Principles.
On the whole, these ALI publications have more influence
on the development of the law than traditional legal scholarship.
Professor Lawrence Waggoner recently reflected on his
involvement with the ALI and the Uniform Law Commission
(ULC), stating that this work was some of his most important as
a law professor because it was only through these projects that
he “was . . . able to influence the law.”14
Both of us are interested in LGBT issues not only from a
theoretical perspective, but also from a practical perspective.
We care deeply about how the law and the legal system treat
LGBT people. For this reason, we strongly support law reform

example of an ALI process for improving state law is the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which sets out Prosser’s privacy torts and heavily influences state law.”).
9 Here we discuss the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, but there
are other examples one could use, including the Restatement of Surety. We thank
Anita Bernstein for this insight.
10 See, e.g., Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years after Adoption:
Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 608-09 (2008) (arguing
that the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution have had an “anemic
influence . . . with rule makers”).
11 See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED: RECASTING THE
CANON 3 (forthcoming) (on file with author) (“How family law is taught helps
determine how the next generation of lawyers, including some future legislators,
regulators, and judges will understand family law and its guiding principles.”).
12 For example, the references to the PRINCIPLES in D. Kelly Weisberg &
Susan Frelich Appleton’s MODERN FAMILY LAW (Aspen) take up almost an entire
column of the index. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN
FAMILY LAW 1172 (3d ed. 2006).
13 See, e.g., RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at vii-ix (consisting of
25 articles critiquing various parties of the Principles); see also Timothy Johnson,
Editor’s Note, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y i (2001) (symposium issue devoted to
consideration of the Principles).
14 Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
727, 731 (2012); see also id. at 738 (“Overriding all the other reasons, though, is the
hope that the work has improved the law.”).
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work, such as the work of the ALI. One of us15 has long been a
member of the ALI and has had the good fortune of
participating in the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of the
Law of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. The
other,16 while not a member of the ALI, has participated in
other law reform efforts.17 Because of the ALI’s unique ability
to affect the development of the law and its application, we
strongly support efforts by the ALI to address LGBT issues in a
comprehensive and thoughtful way.
Undertaking such a project is important from the ALI’s
perspective as well. As the ALI itself explains, the goal of the
organization is to “clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve
the law.”18 LGBT issues are critical legal issues of our times,
and the law on this subject is developing at a rapid pace.
Moreover, LGBT issues cut across the range of subject-matter
areas that the ALI already addresses, as well as those that the
ALI is contemplating for inclusion in future projects.19 As such,
LGBT issues are matters upon which the ALI must provide
guidance in order to further its core goals of clarifying and
modernizing the law. Consideration and inclusion of LGBT
issues in ALI publications will also ensure that the ALI
continues to be viewed as providing relevant and up-to-date
guidance. The completion of such a project would be of great
assistance to lawyers and judges trying to make sense of this
rapidly changing body of law.
II.

INCLUSIVE OR EXCLUSIVE CONSIDERATION?

Having concluded that it is important for the ALI to
engage with LGBT issues, the next question is how this should
be done. As we understood it, the specific question we were
asked to consider was whether there should be a separate,
stand-alone ALI publication on LGBT issues. For a number of
Professor Lawrence Levine.
Professor Courtney Joslin.
17 Author Joslin participated in the drafting of the revised version of the
Uniform Parentage Act, which was promulgated by the ULC in 2002. See, e.g., John J.
Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act (2002), 37 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 3 n.5 (2003). She is also a member of a new ULC study committee that is tasked
with “consider[ing] the need for and feasibility of drafting and enacting state
legislation concerning the rights of third parties to custody of or visitation with a child.”
For more information about this project see Committees: Third Party Child Custody and
Visitation, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=
Third%20Party%20Child%20Custody%20and%20Visitation (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
18 ALI Overview, supra note 1.
19 See, e.g., infra Part III.B.
15
16
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reasons developed in this Part, we believe that the development of
a “Restatement of Gay” is not the best approach. To the contrary,
we think that a more productive and helpful way to engage with
LGBT issues would be for the ALI to comprehensively
incorporate LGBT issues into all of its relevant existing and
future publications.
As a starting place for thinking about this question, we
note that the ALI does not have any publications specifically
devoted to the application of law to any other identity-based
group.20 For example, there is no Restatement of Race or
Restatement of Gender.21 And, as is true with regard to LGBT
identity, we do not advocate the creation of such publications.
But, again as is true with LGBT identity, we do strongly urge
the ALI to consciously and deliberately reflect on whether
existing publications do a good job of taking into account these
social identities and the law’s impact on people in these social
identity categories. There has been some attempt to do this—
largely with regard to the application of particular provisions of
particular publications to women.22 So, for example, some
Restatements have been revised to replace gendered terms
(generally gendered male in the past) with gender-neutral
terms.23 That said, as scholars such as Anita Bernstein,24

20 Although the ALI is currently considering a project on American Indian law.
See, e.g., ALI Considers Possible Project on American Indian Law, 34 A.L.I. REP. 3 (2012),
http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter/spring2012/03-ali-considers-possible-project-americanindian-law.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). We think, however, that that publication is
distinguishable in that Native American law is a distinct body of law.
In her contribution to this symposium, Susan Appleton advocates the
creation of another identity-specific ALI publication—one considering the legal
treatment of children. Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
525 (2014). As she explains, however, legal issues related to children are different from
issues affecting most other identity-based categories—including LGBT identity—because
children are, and in many instances should be, treated in unique ways by the law.
21 See, e.g., Publications Catalog, A.L.I., supra note 1.
22 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Toward More Parsimony and Transparency in
“the Essentials of Marriage,” 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 115 (2011) (noting that the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS “switched its old topic heading for [Section 21,
the section on domicile,] ‘Married Women, Children, and Incompetents’ to the neutralsounding ‘Acquisition and Change of Domicil’”).
23 Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on
Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1357 (2010)
(“[T]he Restatement (Second) used explicitly gendered language, defining negligence as
the failure to act as a ‘reasonable man under like circumstances’ . . . . In contrast to its
predecessor, the Restatement (Third) scrupulously uses gender-neutral language
throughout, relying on inclusive terms such as ‘person’ and ‘actor.’”).
24 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles
and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2001) (arguing
that “the General Principles look at Torts from a gendered perspective: mostly (but far
from uniformly) male”).
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Martha Chamallas,25 and Jennifer Wriggins26 explain, much
more work needs to be done on this front.27 And the need for
further reflection and revision is no less great with regard to
LGBT people.28
So, consciously or not, it appears that the ALI previously
chose to address issues of gender within existing publications
rather than through the creation of a separate, stand-alone
Restatement of Gender. We advocate a similar approach here.
As discussed in more detail in Part III, how this
inclusion should be accomplished will vary depending on the type
of provision and the existing law. In some places, the drafters may
need to consider altering the rules to assure fair and equal
treatment of LGBT people. Some alteration may be necessary, for
example, with regard to provisions that turn on the existence of a
marital relationship. In other places, by contrast, all that may be
needed is more explicit guidance that whatever the announced
principles are, they apply equally to LGBT people.
A.

Limitations of an LGBT-Specific Publication
1. Risk of Marginalization

Addressing LGBT issues in a separate, stand-alone
publication would limit the scope of the potential audience.
Those lawyers and advocates who do not currently serve many
LGBT clients, and who may have given less thought and
reflection to these issues, would be much less likely to make use of
25 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration
from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2115-16 (2007)
[hereinafter Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage]; Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights
in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2005).
26 Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 139, 139-40 (2005) [hereinafter Wriggins, Feminist Revision];
Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 121, 184 (2001).
27 For a very thoughtful and deep examination of the extent to which torts
doctrine, including the Restatement of Torts, fails adequately to take into account
considerations of race and gender, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS,
THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 1 (2010).
28 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Essay, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 426
(2013) (noting that although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS made the
domicile provision gender-neutral, “the Reporter’s Note acknowledges that the genderneutral change to the title is purely semantic”); Wriggins, Feminist Revision, supra
note 26, at 139 (“discuss[ing] some of what feminist perspectives can provide in
connection with torts”); Dolly M. Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): Why Comment e is the Answer to the Woman
Question, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1999) (considering application of Section 6(c) of
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS to women).
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an LGBT-specific publication. The existence of a stand-alone ALI
publication on LGBT issues would also reinforce the intuition of
many that LGBT issues are marginal, and unworthy of
consideration in the “true” or “core” ALI publications.
One of us is the author of several publications that focus
exclusively on LGBT legal issues.29 We hope that these
publications demonstrate that there are benefits from creating
and publishing LGBT-specific publications. In some contexts and
for some purposes, this type of publication makes sense.
Publications devoted to a comprehensive analysis of LGBT legal
issues can be of great use to lawyers who devote a significant
portion of their practice to serving LGBT people and their
families. The existence of this type of publication means that
there is one publication that these lawyers can turn to for
information about many, if not most, of the issues they face in
their practice. Without such publications, these lawyers may
instead have to turn to many different publications every time
they need guidance. Moreover, publications devoted to the
LGBT subject matter might be easier to find in the first
instance because they clearly identify themselves as providing
a comprehensive overview of a particular area of practice. So,
for those people who know they need information about an
LGBT issue, an LGBT-specific publication might be the most
useful source.
There are a number of potential downsides, however, to
addressing LGBT issues in a separate, stand-alone publication.
As a preliminary matter, addressing LGBT issues only in an
LGBT-specific publication would drastically reduce the number
of people who would consider and grapple with the subject
matter. Most of the users of an LGBT-specific ALI publication
likely would be people who write on the topic or lawyers whose
practice includes a significant number of LGBT clients. There
simply are not that many people who fall into these categories.
Moreover, while lawyers who serve LGBT clients likely could
learn more about LGBT issues from a comprehensive, LGBT-

29 See, e.g., COURTNEY G. JOSLIN & SHANNON P. MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW (West 2012); see also NAN D. HUNTER,
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, & SHARON M. MCGOWAN, THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS, GAY MEN,
BISEXUALS, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
HANDBOOK (Eve Cary ed., 4th ed. 2004).
And, of course, many other scholars and lawyers have written books on
legal issues specific to the LGBT community. See, e.g., JOAN M. BURDA, ESTATE
PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES (2d ed. 2013); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002).
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specific ALI publication, this group of lawyers likely has
already done a fair amount of thinking about these issues.
By contrast, people who consider LGBT issues to be
unrelated to their existing area of practice or expertise would
be less likely to utilize such a publication. This group of people
probably is much larger than the former group. And, as a
whole, this larger group of lawyers likely has done much less
thinking about LGBT issues and, therefore, has the most to
learn. To try to put some perspective on the relative sizes of these
two groups, the American Bar Association, which includes only a
slice of all licensed lawyers in this country, has “more than
400,000 members.”30 By contrast, the National LGBT Bar
Association—an association dedicated to LGBT lawyers and
attorneys serving LGBT clients—has approximately 2,500
members.31 Thus, an LGBT-specific ALI publication likely
would be utilized primarily by a relatively small group of
people who already know a fair amount about LGBT issues.
In some ways, this question of incorporation versus
exclusive consideration is related to the debate about how to
include LGBT and other identity-based issues into the law
school curriculum. Having specific seminars addressing LGBT
issues, gender, or race is a positive step. These classes enable
students who are already knowledgeable about and interested
in a particular topic to explore it more deeply. But these classes
do not mitigate the need to incorporate these issues into the
core law school curriculum. As Cheryl Wade has explained in
the context of race:
Ignoring issues of race in the law school’s core courses and relegating
such issues to Law and Race and Critical Race Theory seminars
disserves my students. Discussions of race become marginalized,
exiled to the fringes of the law school curriculum. Only the students
who enroll in “race courses” have available opportunities to discuss
race and racism.32

30 See, e.g., About the ABA Journal, AM. BAR ASS’N J., http://www.abajournal.com/
about (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
31 Email from Liz Youngblood, Program Manager, National LGBT Bar
Association, to authors (June 20, 2013 9:13AM) (on file with authors). And, likely,
many of these lawyers do not practice primarily in the area of LGBT rights.
32 Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting to Discuss Race in Business and Corporate
Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 901, 904-05 (2003) (footnote
omitted). Many other scholars likewise argue that it is important to incorporate issues
of race, class, gender, etc. into the core law school curriculum. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Foreward: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 33-34 (1994); see also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from
Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 55 (1994).
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Especially within an ALI publication that has a good
chance of actually influencing and impacting the development
of the law, it is critical not to marginalize identity-based issues
like sexual orientation and gender identity. It is important to
incorporate these issues into the existing doctrine in a conscious,
thoughtful, and deliberate manner.
2. Discouraging Connections
Addressing LGBT issues in a stand-alone publication
can inhibit rather than enable the ability of scholars, lawyers,
and judges to see the connections between legal issues affecting
LGBT people and those affecting non-LGBT people. Failing to
see the connections between related legal issues is of particular
concern in the LGBT context.33 There is already a tendency to
see legal issues affecting LGBT people as utterly distinct from
those affecting non-LGBT people. Having an LGBT-specific
publication may fuel rather than break this cycle.
Bowers v. Hardwick34 is a striking example of this
tendency. Bowers involved a constitutional challenge to a Georgia
sodomy statute. The statute criminalized oral and anal sex
regardless of the sex, sexual orientation, or marital status of the
participants.35 Because of its broad scope, the statute was initially
challenged by two sets of plaintiffs: a gay man who had been
arrested and charged for violating the statute,36 and a
heterosexual married couple who claimed the statute chilled
their sexual activity.37

33 See, e.g., Charlton C. Copeland, Creation Stories: Stanley Hauerwas, SameSex Marriage, and Narrative in Law and Theology, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 87, 88
(2012) (“The translation of LGBT lives to the larger public has been one of the most
significant strategies of the mainstream LGBT equality movement.”).
34 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
35 The statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984), criminalized sodomy, which
was defined as follows: “A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another.” See Brief for Petitioner, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85140), 1986 WL 720442, at *5 (authored by Laurence Tribe and Kathleen Sullivan) (“In
Section 16-6-2, the State of Georgia has criminalized certain sexual activities defined
solely by the parts of the body they involve, no matter who engages in them, with
whom, or where.”).
36 “After a preliminary hearing, the District Attorney decided not to present the
matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed.” Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
37 See id. at 188 n.2 (“John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in the action.
They alleged that they wished to engage in sexual activity proscribed [by the statute]
in the privacy of their home, . . . and that they had been ‘chilled and deterred.’”).
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By the time the case was decided by the Supreme Court,
the married couple had been dismissed from the lawsuit.38 With
Michael Hardwick as the sole remaining challenger to the law,
the Court reframed the issue as one implicating only LGBT
people. According to the Court, the question presented by the case
was whether “the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”39 It was only by
reframing the question in this way—that is, by entirely
distancing the statute from any impact on or relevance to
heterosexual people—that the Court reached the conclusion
that the claims presented in the case bore “no connection” to
“family, marriage, or procreation.”40
If the Court had not engaged in this kind of siloing or
ghettoizing of LGBT issues, it would have had to answer the
astute question posed by Justice Stevens in his dissent. That is,
the Court would have had to explain why some persons in
Georgia, namely lesbian and gay people, did not have “the
same interest in ‘liberty’ that others ha[d].”41
We believe that discrimination against LGBT people
will not be eliminated until courts and policymakers are forced
to appreciate the connections between legal issues as they
affect LGBT and non-LGBT people.42 Having a separate LGBTspecific publication would, we think, obscure these connections
rather than bring them into focus.

38 Id. (noting that the district court had dismissed the heterosexual couple on
standing grounds, that this holding was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and that the
couple “[did] not challenge that holding in this Court”).
39 Id. at 190.
40 Id. at 191 (“Accepting the decisions in these cases and the above
description of them, we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those
cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has
been demonstrated[.]”).
41 Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Almost twenty years later, the Court
did make this connection between the rights of LGBT people and the rights of nonLGBT people when it overruled Bowers. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)
(“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.”). See
generally Lawrence C. Levine, Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, and
the Struggle for Marriage Equality, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 10-16 (2013).
42 To be clear, seeing connections between LGBT and non-LGBT people does
not necessarily mean one advocating for LGBT rights must employ a “we are just like
straight” people argument. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY
L.J. 1361, 1368-75 (2005) (examining the “like-straight reasoning” employed in Goodridge v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)). The point is simply to emphasize the
importance of seeing LGBT people as people who should be entitled to the same rights and
protections as other people even if they are not “just like” straight people.
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Benefits of Inclusion
1. Moving the Ball Forward Faster

An inclusive, rather than an exclusive, approach also
holds the potential to move the law forward more quickly on
controversial issues. A good example of this potential was
demonstrated by one of the ALI’s own projects—the Model Penal
Code (MPC). In May of 1955, the ALI approved a tentative draft
of the MPC that decriminalized all consensual sodomy, regardless
of the actor’s sex or sexual orientation.43
To be clear, despite their proposal to decriminalize samesex private sodomy, the ALI drafters certainly did not intend to
further a “homosexual agenda.” Indeed, even though the MPC
decriminalized private consensual same-sex sexual intimacy, the
drafters nonetheless held the view that such conduct was deviant
and something from which the public should be protected when
not hidden from sight.44 Accordingly, the MPC continued to
criminalize “loiter[ing] in or near any public place for the
purpose of soliciting or being solicited to engage in deviate sexual
relations.”45 And the accompanying comments made clear that the
purpose of this provision was to prevent the “congregation of
homosexuals offensively flaunting their deviance from general
norms of behavior.”46
Thus, in urging the decriminalization of sodomy, the
MPC drafters were not seeking to promote LGBT rights.
Instead, it was the byproduct of the approach they utilized.
43 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 631, 662 (1999) (“[T]he influential American Law Institute (ALI) narrowly voted
in May 1955 to decriminalize consensual sodomy in a tentative draft of its proposed
Model Penal Code.”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS:
SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 1861–2003, 124 (2008) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE,
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS] (“As earlier versions had done, the final MPC made [sodomy]
a crime only if it was forcible (or its equivalent) or with a minor.”).
44 See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 675-76 (1963) (noting that the MPC drew a line between private
and public displays of “deviate sexuality”).
45 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 (1985).
46 Schwartz, supra note 44, at 675, 683 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3,
status note at 237). The status note provides:

[T]he main objective is to suppress the open flouting of prevailing moral
standards as a sort of nuisance in public thoroughfares and parks. In the case
of females, suppression of professionals is likely to accomplish that objective.
In the case of males, there is a greater likelihood that non-professional
homosexuals will congregate and behave in a manner grossly offensive to
other users of public facilities.
Id.
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Rather than considering homosexual sodomy in isolation, the
drafters assessed the sodomy provisions in the context of broad
review of all sex crimes. The need to revise these provisions
was prompted in part by the Kinsey studies of the 1950s.47
These studies showed that large numbers of adults—including
large numbers of heterosexual adults—engaged in so-called
“deviate” sexual activity.48 To the drafters, “the criminalization of
conduct that most people thought was acceptable [such as
fornication] threatened the very legitimacy of the law.”49
Ultimately, the drafters concluded that only conduct that
harmed third parties should be regulated by the criminal law.50
The proposal to decriminalize all private sodomy—
including same-sex sodomy—may seem unsurprising today, but
it was quite remarkable given the historical context in which
the drafters were working. At the time of drafting “[i]n the
1950s, gay [male] sex was illegal everywhere.”51 It was a time
when “‘enlightened opinion’ held that homosexuality was a
mental illness.”52 Further, the government was engaged in a
“massive anti-homosexual campaign.”53 This campaign ranged
from President Eisenhower’s 1953 executive order requiring
the discharge of all gay and lesbian employees from any form of

47 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 43, at 121
(noting that the MPC drafting committee “gathered reams of materials, including the
Kinsey reports”); id. at 122 (noting that the comments to § 207.5 include data from the
Kinsey reports).
48 See, e.g., Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model
Penal Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1017, 1032 (2009) (“Citing two
reports by University of Indiana Professor Alfred Kinsey, Wechsler[,] [the Chief
Reporter of the MPC,] noted that ‘a large proportion of the population is guilty at one
time or another’ of adultery, while pre-marital intercourse was ‘very common and
widely tolerated.’” (footnote omitted)).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 cmt. at 207 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1955) (“The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce purely moral
or religious standards. We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to
control behavior that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the
actor. Such matters are best left to religious, educational and other social influences.”);
id. cmt. at 277-78 (“No harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in
atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult partners. This area of private
morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities. . . . [T]here is the fundamental
question of the protection to which every individual is entitled against state
interference in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others.”).
51 Arthur S. Leonard, Thoughts on Lawrence v. Texas, 11 WIDENER L. REV.
171, 172 (2005) (“In the 1950s, gay sex was illegal everywhere in the United States, as
it had been since the dawn of our nation.”).
52 Id.
53 Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), (No. 02-102), 2003 WL
152350, at *16 [hereinafter Historians’ Brief in Lawrence].
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federal employment,54 to the FBI’s so-called Sex Deviant
Program, which sought to root out homosexuals by spying on
individuals alleged to be gay or lesbian and to spread rumors of
purported homosexuality.55
As William Eskridge explains, “[d]ecriminalization [of
sodomy] would have been impossible [during this time] if
legislators had thought that they were advancing civil rights for
homosexuals.”56 The decriminalization of gay sodomy was
achieved only by couching these changes within a broad scale
criminal law reform effort that impacted the lives of a wide
spectrum of the American public, including but not limited to
LGBT people.
The promulgation of the MPC certainly did not result in
the speedy or full-scale repeal of all sodomy statutes. Repeals
were fairly slow to come. But, come they did. By 1979, 17 years
after the MPC was completed (in 1962), “[24] states . . . had
decriminalized consensual sodomy.”57 States that maintained
anti-sodomy statutes rarely enforced them. When states did
charge someone with sodomy, the charge was usually a tagalong charge along with rape. The sodomy charge assured a
criminal conviction even in cases where all of the elements of
rape could not be established.58
Of course, it is not always the case that inclusive
approaches are the most expedient paths to large-scale change.
Arguably, the adoption of same-sex domestic partnership
legislation is an example to the contrary. That is, one could argue
that states were more willing to adopt these alternative legal
relationship statuses because they would extend rights only to a
limited subset of unmarried couples: same-sex couples. If, by
contrast, these alternative statuses were viewed as a broadscale attempt to make marriage matter less, states might have
Id.
“J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI . . . also played a key role—through a ‘Sex Deviates’
program that Hoover initiated in 1951—in spying on alleged homosexuals,
disseminating rumors of homosexuality, and purging homosexuals from government
service.” David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 906 (2008). Local
police departments likewise “stepped up their raids on bars and private parties.”
Historians’ Brief in Lawrence, supra note 53, at *19.
56 ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 43, at 138.
57 Id. at 201 (also noting that “two states recriminalized it after a short period”).
58 Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making
the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 156-57 (1988) (“Though
sodomy statutes are rarely used—at present—against consenting heterosexual adults,
they are often used against persons charged with sexual assault or abuse when there is
doubt on the issue of consent.” (footnote omitted)).
54
55
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been less likely to adopt them. For example, as Douglas NeJaime
explains, California’s groundbreaking domestic partnership law
was largely limited to same-sex couples59 as then-Governor Gray
Davis had “expressed his resistance to a bill that included
different-sex couples because such inclusion threatened to
minimize the importance of marriage by providing a nonmarital
choice to those who could otherwise marry.”60
While there are some examples to the contrary,
advances regarding LGBT rights often have occurred when
courts, policy makers, and the public recognized the connections
between the rights and general humanity of LGBT and nonLGBT people.61
2. Encouraging Holistic Reflection and Engagement
Addressing LGBT issues in an inclusive way better
enables one to appreciate the underlying cause of unfair or
anachronistic rules and principles. By contrast, addressing
LGBT issues through a separate publication might prompt the
creation of solutions that resolve only part of a larger problem; it
is almost always the case that the rules that apply unfairly to
LGBT people harm other people as well. In particular, such
rules also tend to have a disproportionately negative effect on
other vulnerable groups, including people of color, lower income
people, and women. An inclusive approach would encourage
comprehensive, rather than partial, reforms.
As discussed in more detail below, the two types of rules
deserving reform are those that turn on the existence of a
marriage or other legally recognized relationship and those that

59 As a compromise position, the California law permitted different-sex
couples to register if both members of the different-sex couple were 62 years of age or
older. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 93 (West). In 2001, California amended the law to permit
different-sex couples to register so long as one member was 62 years of age or older.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004); 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 91 (West).
60 Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital
Recognition and its Impact on Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file
with authors) (“While inclusion of same-sex couples did not threaten marriage since
those couples could not marry, inclusion of different-sex couples detracted from
marriage’s channeling function.”). For a contrary account of this history, see, e.g.,
Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went From Innovation to
Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 297-99 (2013).
61 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219,
263 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/constitutionallaw/windsor%E2%80%99s-right-to-marry/ (noting that the marriage equality movement did
not begin to achieve regular success until people saw LGBT relationships as worthy of equal
dignity and respect).
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relate to discriminatory or biased conduct. Both types of rules
have implications beyond LGBT people.
Marriage discrimination is one source of the legal
vulnerabilities some LGBT couples and their families face.
Although the law is changing, it remains the case that most
same-sex couples cannot enter into marriages that are
recognized as valid by their home states.62 As for transgender
people, the vast majority of states lack clear guidance for
assessing the validity of a marriage involving a transgender
person.63 As a result, rules that turn on the existence of a valid
marriage or the existence of some other formal familial
relationship have a disproportionately negative impact on
LGBT people.64
To ensure that rules do not disproportionately and
unfairly exclude LGBT people, it is critical to examine
instances in which a right or protection—or conversely, a
criminal provision—turns on the existence or lack of a marital
or family relationship. There are many such provisions in the
area of family law, ranging from provisions regarding legal
parentage65 to others governing the distribution of property

62 As of January 2014, 17 states and the District of Columbia permit or soon
will permit same-sex couples to marry. See, e.g., Gay Marriage, PROCON.Org,
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last updated
Jan. 6, 2014); Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other Relationship
Recognition Laws (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_
equality_1-14-2014.pdf. Stated in the converse, same-sex couples in the remaining 33
states may not be able to enter into marriages that are considered valid in their home
states. Gay Marriage, supra; Human Rights Campaign, supra; see also Human Rights
Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/
files/assets/resources/marriage_prohibitions_1-14-2014.pdf (providing that 29 states have
constitutional amendments restricting marriage to heterosexual couples and that 4
additional states have statutes restricting marriage to heterosexual couples).
63 Jennifer L. Levi, Forward, Symposium: Issues in Estate Planning for
Same-Sex and Transgender Couples, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 671, 673 (2008) (“Just as
same-sex couples face legal uncertainty regarding their status, so too do couples where
one of the partners is transgendered.”).
64 Same-sex couples from anywhere in the U.S. can marry in any one of the
jurisdictions that permit same-sex couples to marry; none of these jurisdictions has a
residency requirement. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: SameSex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2011). But if the
same-sex couple lives in a state that does not permit them to enter into a same-sex
marriage, it is very likely that that their home state will not recognize their marriage.
See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws, supra note
62 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2010) (noting that
“in the vast majority of states, the existing statutory provisions or common law address
only the legal parentage of children born to married couples through alternative
insemination”).
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upon dissolution of the relationship.66 But family law is not the
only area of law in which rights or protections turn on marriage.
For example, most states’ criminal law and the ALI’s MPC treat
marital rape differently than rape by someone other than a
spouse.67 In the civil domain, the tort of alienation of affections
applies only to the alienation of the affections of a spouse.68
If one decided to deal with LGBT issues in a separate,
LGBT-specific publication, one might devise a set of special
rules that seeks to address the legal vulnerabilities faced by
LGBT people. This LGBT-specific solution might be to create a
separate legal familial status available only to same-sex
couples, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships, or to
advocate that same-sex couples be permitted to marry. Having
purportedly “resolved” the challenges faced by same-sex
couples, one might then think “our job is now done; we’ve
solved the problem.”
Resolving these specific legal inadequacies by creating a
set of rules applicable only to LGBT couples, however, would
leave many other families vulnerable. As Nancy Polikoff has
explained, “the injustice same-sex couples suffer [as a result of
marriage-based rules] is not unique.”69 Lesbian and gay couples
are far from the only couples that are unmarried, and,
therefore, are left vulnerable by a legal system that uses
marriage as a prerequisite to a huge array of rights and
protections. Increasing numbers of different-sex couples are
cohabiting outside of marriage.70 But despite this reality,
66 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?,
13 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 289, 289 (2011) (“The fact of whether a married or unmarried
couple is cohabitating may have a significant impact on a number of family law doctrines.
Perhaps the best known of these doctrines involves the question of whether a party to nonmarital cohabitating relationship is entitled to a share of property accumulated by the other
party during the relationship upon its termination.” (footnotes omitted)); Courtney G. Joslin,
The Evolution of the American Family, 36 HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2009) (noting that, “generally
speaking, . . . unmarried cohabitants do not take on or acquire obligations to support each
other or to share in their partner’s earnings”).
67 Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of
Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1465
(2009) (noting that “[a]t least twenty-four states . . . retain some form of a marital rape
exception”); Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence
and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 275 (2007) (“Most rape
statutes, including the MPC, stipulated that rape was forced sexual intercourse with a
woman not his wife, thus creating a marital rape exemption for husbands.”).
68 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 (1976) (“Alienation of
Spouse’s Affections”); see also WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 12, at 312 (noting
that one of the elements of the tort of alienation of affections is “a valid marriage”).
69 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123 (2008).
70 See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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marriage remains a prerequisite for access to hundreds of
critical rights and protections. Taking into account all of these
changing demographics and family formation patterns is
absolutely critical to engender thoughtful and effective reform.
Historically, most people who could marry71 married and
stayed married until they or their spouses died.72 In such a
world, using marriage as the line for allocating rights and
responsibilities made sense.73 But this pattern of behavior is
simply no longer the overwhelming norm. “Between 1950 and
2000, married-couple households declined from more than
three-fourths of all households (78 percent) to just over one-half
(52 percent).”74 And today, the number has now dropped below
50%.75 As the number of married couples has decreased,
cohabitation rates have increased dramatically. According to
the U.S. Census, there were 523,000 cohabiting couples in
1970.76 By 2000, this number had increased ten-fold, to almost
5.5 million.77 And about 50% of people who marry will divorce
at least once.78 In sum, there simply are many more adults who
are living in non-marital relationships than there were in the
past.79 Indeed, a 2010 Pew Study found that almost 40% of
Americans report that marriage is becoming obsolete.80

71 Slaves were not permitted to marry. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke,
Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 251, 252 (1999) (“Antebellum social rules and laws considered
enslaved people morally and legally unfit to marry.”).
72 See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 66, at 2.
73 Marriage also “played a crucial role in the creation and replication of the
social and cultural roles for men and women.” Id.
74 U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century, at 2 (Nov.
2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf.
75 “The 2010 Census reported that, for the first time in history, married
couples constituted fewer than one-half of all American households.” Erez Aloni,
Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 580 (2013) (citing Sabrina Tavernise,
Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2011),
http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/26marry.html).
76 See Ann Laquer Estin, Golden Anniversary Reflections: Changes in
Marriage After Fifty Years, 42 FAM. L.Q. 333, 336 n.21 (2008).
77 Id. at 336.
78 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 4 (2009).
79 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, Introduction, at 31
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (“During the final quarter of the 20th century, all western
countries experienced extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital cohabitation.”).
80 Pew Research Center, The Decline of Marriage and the Rise of New
Families 21, 64 (Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter The Decline of Marriage], available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf
(“Most adults ages 65 and older are critical of these unmarried couples, whether they
are same-sex or opposite-sex couples. Most young adults, ages 18 to 29, are not.”).
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Although it was not true historically, today, reliance on
formal family status has profound racial and class
implications.81 According to the same 2010 Pew Study:
50 years ago there was virtually no difference by socio-economic
status in the proclivity to marry: 76% of college graduates and 72%
of adults who did not attend college were married in 1960. By 2008,
that small gap had widened to a chasm: 64% of college graduates
were married, compared with just 48% of those with a high school
diploma or less.82

The marriage rate gap is even greater for some racial or
ethnic groups. “Blacks (32%) are much less likely than whites
(56%) to be married, and this gap has increased significantly
over time.”83
Studies suggest that part of the reason for this growing
socio-economic and racial divide is the belief of some people
that they should delay marriage until they have achieved
financial security.84 Changes in our economy have made this goal
of financial security much more difficult to achieve.85 But
whatever the reason, it is clear that cohabitation is on the rise,
particularly among people with less education and fewer
financial resources.
In other words, not only does the use of marriage-based
rules result in the exclusion of many lesbian and gay people,
these rules also disproportionately exclude people of color and
lower and middle-class people. And, more fundamentally, in
many situations, marriage-based rules may no longer do a good
job of correctly screening the people who should be entitled to
those rights and protections.86 Thinking about LGBT issues in
a vacuum would inhibit law reformers’ ability to think more
reflectively and broadly about whether and in what
81 See, e.g., June Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex
Marriage?, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 324-25 (2010) (“The cumulative result of these
[demographic and economic] changes is that family form has become a marker of class
and culture. . . . For the poorest Americans, concentrated in urban centers, marriage
has effectively disappeared.”).
82 The Decline of Marriage, supra note 80, at 23.
83 Id.
84 J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender,
and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 542 (2011).
85 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 81, at 321 (“The Journal of Economic
Literature, for example, reports that that while wages across the population rose in
lockstep through the 1960s, they began to diverge in 1970, with the top ten percent of
the population enjoying a substantial increase in earnings that has accelerated since
the 1980s, the middle stagnating, and the relative earning power of the bottom ten
percent of males declining significantly over the last forty years.”).
86 For a comprehensive and thoughtful consideration of this question, see
POLIKOFF, supra note 69.
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circumstances marriage should continue to be a prerequisite to
legal rights and protections. As Rachel Moran explains,
“concerns about access to marriage are significant, but the
most profound questions of justice could turn on how we rectify
the gap between those who choose to express their affection
through marriage and those who do not.”87
Using marriage as a prerequisite for critical legal
remedies and protections has a disproportionately negative effect
not only on LGBT people, but also on lower income people and
people of color. The important rights or provisions that turn on
the existence of a valid marriage include, but certainly are not
limited to, the right to sue for loss of consortium or for a wrongful
death, and whether a forced sexual encounter is considered
rape. In light of the importance of these provisions, and the
large and growing number of couples who are living together
outside of marriage, the ALI should carefully consider whether
existing marriage-based requirements do a good job of identifying
those people who should be entitled to a given right or remedy.
And looking beyond provisions that turn on the
existence of a marital relationship, addressing LGBT issues in
a separate, stand-alone publication may reduce the likelihood
of broader and deeper reflection about the extent to which
existing bodies of law are shaped by and, in some cases, still
reflect our discriminatory past. Many other scholars have
written about how various bodies of law fail to adequately
protect people who are the victims of discriminatory and biased
conduct. For example, Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins
argue that “when viewed through a wider cultural lens, the basic
structure of contemporary tort law still tends to reflect and
reinforce the social marginalization of women and racial
minorities and to place a lower value on their lives, activities,
and potential.”88 It is only by reforming the doctrine as a whole,
and not just as it applies to members of one particular group,
that one can truly assess whether such biases exist and, if so,
how to appropriately remedy them.

87 Rachel F. Moran, Beyond the Loving Analogy: The Independent Logic of SameSex Marriage, in LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND
MARRIAGE 252 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds. 2012).
88 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 27, at 2.
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As explained above, we believe that LGBT issues should
be incorporated into all existing and future ALI publications,
rather than addressed in a separate, stand-alone publication.
But how, exactly, should this incorporation be done?
There is the preliminary question of what these ALI
publications generally should aim to accomplish. Should the
relevant ALI subject-matter publications simply restate the
law as it is? That is, should the publication seek to cull the
current majority approach to a thorny legal issue? Or should
the publications be more aspirational and seek to state the law
as it should be, regardless of its current state?89
The answer may vary to some degree depending on the
subject matter of the publication or the particular provision at
issue.90 There are some areas of law where development and
evolution are happening at a fairly rapid pace.91 Other areas
are fairly well settled, at least relatively speaking.92 How
aspirational the publication should be depends on where on
this spectrum the particular body of law falls.93 That said,
while there has been ongoing debate about what the
Restatements should do,94 it seems clear to us that the
89 For more comprehensive discussions of this debate, see, e.g., V. William
Scarpato, Comment, “Is” v. “Ought,” or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Restatement, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 413, 414-15 (2013); Anita Bernstein, Restatement
Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1667-68 (1995) (reviewing JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT
LIABILITY (1994)).
90 It will also be affected by the type of publication. Some ALI publications
are more overtly aspirational in nature. Such publications include “Principles of.”
Other publications, such as the Restatements, at least purport to be less aspirational.
See, e.g., Publications Catalog, A.L.I., supra note 1. (comparing Principles to
Restatements).
91 E.g., Intellectual Property.
92 E.g., Judgments. The Restatement of Judgments has not been revised since
1982. See id.
93 See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the
Family: The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 923-24 (2001) (noting that because of the “brisk pace of
cultural and technological change” in the area of family law, a “Restatement” is
“unthinkable”).
94 G. Edward White, From the Second Restatements to the Present: The ALI’s
Recent History and Current Challenges, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 305, 319 (2013) (“Looking
back to the formative years of the Second Restatements, one gets a sense that ALI
projects have consistently struggled to define the relationship between black-letter
principles and the policy dimensions of legal synthesis, and between the declarative
and normative dimensions of lawmaking[.]”); see also Kristen David Adams, Blaming
the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 206 (2007)
(“Criticism of the American Law Institute and the Restatement movement is a common
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Restatements are intended to and often do accomplish much
more than simply restate the existing law.95
As an example, even though much of tort law is fairly
settled, the treatment of defective products in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts was highly innovative.96 Likewise, the treatment
of duty in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is widely divergent
from the approach of the majority of jurisdictions.97 And there are
many other examples of aspirational Restatement provisions that
do not simply state the law as it is.
Moreover, we think it would be a missed opportunity if
the drafters were limited to the goal of articulating the current
state of the law. The drafters of the ALI publications are among
phenomenon and comes from two sides. The critique from one side is that the
Restatements are too activist, stating the law as the Institute believes it should be
rather than the law as it is. The critique from the other side is that the Institute is too
conservative—frozen in time in the late 1800s or early 1900s—and fails to incorporate
the best contemporary practices in the study of law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also John
P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 617 (1998)
(“A problem, which has confronted the Institute from then until now, was
foreshadowed in that original committee report: the problem of the ‘is or the ought’; is
it the function of a Restatement to report precisely what the law is, as by counting
decisions, or should it give some consideration to what the law ought to be?”).
95 See, e.g., White, supra note 94, at 307 (quoting former ALI Director
Herbert Wechsler as stating that “when the Institute’s adoption of the view of a
minority of courts has helped to shift the balance of authority, it is quite clear that this
has been regarded as a vindication of our judgment and a proper cause for exultation”);
see also Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 434 (2004) (“Despite the project’s name, some
evidence suggests that the Restatements were never meant simply to re-state the
common law of the United States.”); Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 292 (noting
that a plaque hangs in the ALI Conference Room quoting Herbert Wechsler’s
perspective that, while the majority law position should be given weight it “[sh]ould not
be thought to be conclusive”).
96 See, e.g., Charles E. Cantu, The Recycling, Dismantling, and Destruction of
Goods as a Foreseeable Use Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
46 ALA. L. REV. 81, 81 n.1 (1994) (describing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS rule
regarding defective products as “innovative”). Indeed, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS created the tort of strict products liability in the highly influential Section 402A,
at a time when the concept “had almost no support in American jurisprudence.” Green
& Moréteau, supra note 4, at 302; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of
Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (1992) (“Section 402A [of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts] did not ‘restate’ the dominant common law rule in America circa 1964; rather
it reflected the judgment of the ALI as to what the law should be.”).
97 See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CALIF.
L. REV. 671, 671-72 (2008) (“The Restatement (Third) of Torts (‘Third Restatement’)
confronts the duty question head on, but has received stinging criticism for failing to
restate the law.”).
For other examples of Restatement provisions that adopt minority
positions, see, e.g., Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753,
761 (2011) (discussing how the Restatement of Servitudes, at least “[o]n its face
significantly departs from the familiar elements of traditional servitude law (which it
acknowledges courts still routinely use)”).
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the leading legal thinkers in their respective areas of law. Where
they are of the opinion that change is important and necessary,
they should have the ability to advocate for that change.98
In terms of assessing when the drafters should state the
law as it should be rather than as it is, one of the co-reporters
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm) and his co-author put it quite nicely: Deviation
from the majority rule in a Restatement is the right thing to do
“[w]hen there are sufficiently powerful reasons to reject a
majority rule or to anticipate an incipient reform that has not
yet fully taken hold.”99 For the reasons discussed below, we
believe that a more forward-looking approach is appropriate
with respect to many of the provisions affecting the rights of
LGBT people.
The demographics of and the law governing families and
family relationships are changing at a rapid pace. As a result,
not only is it difficult to “restate” the law as it is (because there is
so much variation), but any such restatement would be quickly
out of date. The ALI appears to have reached the same
conclusion. Thus, the ALI’s recent publication on families—the
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution—forthrightly seeks to
state not what the law is but what the law should be in order to
serve today’s families.100 With regard to areas of law that are
either widely criticized or are not keeping up with changes on
the ground,101 this type of overtly reformist approach is not only
appropriate but also necessary. Other areas of law may not
require such wide-scale reevaluation and assessment, but even

98 Cf. Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the
American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 145, 161 (2007) (“This might
be a good time for the Institute to consider other areas of law where our work would
seek to contribute to enlightenment and debate rather than to articulating definitive
legal principles.”).
99 Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 294.
100 While there certainly has been a fair amount of criticism of particular
conclusions reached by the drafters, see, e.g., RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4
(consisting of 25 articles critiquing various parts of the Principles), the Principles have
provoked thoughtful and critically needed reflection on the current state of family law
and the ways in which family law should evolve.
101 Both comments could be lodged against family law. To use just one
example, scholars widely criticize the “best interest of the child” standard that is used
by all fifty states with regard to child custody determinations. See, e.g., Katharine K.
Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing
Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1559 (1998) (“Few legal standards have encountered
as much criticism in as short a time as has the best interest of the child standard.”).
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in these other areas, there may be individual rules that are in
need of updating.102
When one contemplates the inclusion of LGBT issues
into ALI publications, it becomes even clearer that the relevant
provisions may need to have a more aspirational goal. The process
of drafting and adopting Restatements is “excruciatingly slow.”103
Moreover, the revision process is only periodic; once the slow
process of drafting a Restatement is complete, the process
generally is not restarted for quite some time. For example,
three decades passed between the completion of the second and
the third Restatement of Torts.104
By contrast, the law on LGBT issues is evolving at a
rapid pace.105 If ALI publications simply stated what the law is,
they would cement in place (in some areas of law, for an entire
generation or more) law that has already or quickly will
become outdated. The Restatement of Torts nicely illustrates
this point. One of the very few places that the Restatement
(Third) of Torts expressly mentions LGBT issues is with regard
to recovery for bystander emotional distress.106 Section 48 of the
Restatement provides that one can only recover for bystander
emotional distress if, among other things, one is a “close family
member.”107 Of course, in most jurisdictions in the United States,
same-sex and other unmarried partners—even long-term,
committed partners—are considered legal strangers, not “family
members,”108 and therefore are unable to recover for this tort.

102 For example, as discussed above, while Torts is largely fairly settled, some
rules have had to adapt over time to reflect new developments and understandings of
the law. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
103 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code
Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41
BUS. LAW. 1343, 1347 (1986) (noting that “the study, promulgation, and enactment of
uniform state laws and amendments is an excruciatingly slow and cumbersome process”).
104 Volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS were published
in 1965. Publications Catalog, A.L.I., supra note 1. The third edition of A Concise
Restatement of Torts was published almost fifty years later, in 2013. Id.
105 See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, “Gen Silent”: Advocating for LGBT Elders, 19
ELDER L.J. 289, 324 (2012) (“The legal landscape of marriage equality is evolving so rapidly
that any attempt to describe the patchwork of relationship recognition laws that exist across
the United States is quickly outdated.”); Susan Hazeldean, Confounding Identities: The
Paradox of LGBT Children Under Asylum Law, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 373, 375 (2011)
(“Only four years earlier, the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of sodomy laws that
subjected LGBT people to criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Since then, the case law
on LGBT rights has evolved rapidly.” (footnotes omitted)).
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 (2012).
107 Id.
108 Meredith E. Green, Comment, Who Knows Where the Love Grows?:
Unmarried Cohabitants and Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2009) (“Among the class of plaintiffs
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While the Reporters’ Note acknowledges the likelihood of this
outcome, and while the Restatement’s accompanying comments
suggest that courts “take into account changing practices and
social norms and employ a functional approach” when defining
what “constitutes a family,”109 the text of the Restatement itself
does not mandate such an approach.110
One of us111 contacted Michael Green, Reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, to discuss section 48 and its
application to, and likely exclusion of, same-sex partners.
Green was asked whether he felt he had the authority to draft
a more inclusive Restatement provision, rather than just urge
such a standard in the comments.112 While Green opined that
as a Reporter he did have this authority, he acknowledged that
they did not exercise this authority with regard to same-sex
partners. Green noted, however, that much had changed in the
last few years and that it is quite possible that if the section
were drafted in 2013 rather than in 2007, it would have indeed
advocated that same-sex couples in certain committed
relationships be considered “close family members” entitled to
sue.113 To the extent that ALI publications intend and purport
only to restate what the law is, it is surely hard for the
Restatements to have the agility to remain current, especially
in areas of law that evolve at a rapid pace, like those affecting
LGBT people.
B.

Incorporation Where?

In undertaking the task of reviewing and potentially
revising provisions that affect LGBT people, an important
question arises: How should one go about identifying which of
the thousands of provisions in the hundreds of ALI publications
merit reconsideration and revision? One group of provisions
that may be in need of revision are those provisions that turn
on the existence of a family or marital relationship. By this, we
do not only mean provisions in publications that focus on
families and their rights, like the Principles of the Law of
whom this [close family member] limitation has excluded, unmarried cohabitants have
been especially affected[.]” (footnotes omitted)).
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48
cmt. f (2012).
110 See infra Part III.D.1.
111 Professor Lawrence Levine.
112 Interview with Michael Green, Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS (Jan. 16. 2013) (notes on file with authors).
113 Id.
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Family Dissolution or the Restatement (Third) of the Law, Trusts.
Instead, we mean any provision that uses a marital or family
relationship as a prerequisite. This would include provisions
criminalizing certain consensual sexual conduct114 or rape.115 It
would also include spousal evidentiary privileges and relational
torts that are available only to close family members. When the
Restatements use the terms marriage or family, they refer to
that status as a matter of the relevant state law.116 Thus, if the
couple lives in a state that does not recognize marriages
between same-sex couples,117 parties to that relationship will be
excluded from those areas of tort, property, and criminal law
that use marriage as a prerequisite.
Relationship-based rights, however, are not the only
areas where LGBT issues should be taken into account.
Examples of other types of provisions that may also require
additional reflection regarding their impact on LGBT people
include provisions pertaining to discrimination. These provisions
appear in a range of ALI publications, from the Restatement
(Second) of Property: Landlord and Tenant,118 to the Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law.119 Provisions that relate to a person’s
114 Historically, states criminalized sexual activity outside of the bounds of
marriage. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime
of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1888 (2012); Melissa
Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of
Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1268-69 (2009) (“Until the late twentieth century,
the criminal law in most jurisdictions prohibited fornication—sex outside of marriage—
thereby highlighting marriage’s role as the licensed locus for sexual activity.” (footnotes
omitted)); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59
EMORY L.J. 809, 814-15 (2010) (“Criminal law traditionally prohibited and punished a
wide range of sexual activity, including sex between unmarried people, [and] sex
between a married person and someone other than his or her spouse[.]”).
115 Historically, marital rape was not criminalized. Joslin, supra note 66, at 2
(noting that “[a]t common law, the concept of marital rape was a legal impossibility”).
Even today, most states treat marital rape differently than rape by a nonspouse. Jill
Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1373, 1375 (2000) (“A majority of states still retain some form of the common law
regime: They criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within marriage,
subject the marital rape they do recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create
special procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions.” (footnotes omitted)).
116 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM,
§ 48, cmt. f (2012) (“[T]his Section does require that the person seeking recovery be a
close family member, howsoever defined by the jurisdiction[.]”).
117 And, as of January 2014, the vast majority of states still refuse to recognize
marriages between two people of the same sex. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide
Marriage Prohibition Laws (June 4, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/
marriage_prohibitions_072013.pdf.
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3.1 (1976)
(regarding “[r]estrictions on [f]reedom to [r]efuse to [l]ease,” including conduct
prohibited by state and federal nondiscrimination statutes).
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009) (“Wrongful Discipline in Violation of Public Policy”).
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membership in a certain identity-based group—such as those that
may apply in the defamation context—may also be in need of
reconsideration.120 The concern raised by these two types of
provisions121 is whether LGBT identity is being treated similarly
to other types of identity-based characteristics. So, for example,
with regard to defamation, the question would be whether being
falsely accused of being gay is treated in the same way as being
falsely accused of being African American or Latino.122
C.

Existing Examples of LGBT Incorporation

An example of an existing ALI publication that
comprehensively includes and takes account of LGBT people is
the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.123 The Principles
do not single out LGBT issues or address them in separate
provisions or sections. Instead, the Principles forthrightly apply
equally to all families, without regard to the gender or sexual
orientation of the parents.124 The Principles demonstrate an
understanding and appreciation of how a growing number of
unmarried couples should be treated under the law. The
Principles largely take the position that there should be less,
rather than more, difference in the legal treatment of married
and unmarried couples.125
Thus, although there are provisions in the Principles
that apply to married couples,126 the same property division

120 See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT
Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1711 (2010) (discussing the application of a number
of privacy torts to LGBT plaintiffs).
121 That is, those related to discrimination and those related to identity-based
characteristics.
122 See infra Part III.D.2.B.
123 See, e.g., June Carbone, Back to the Future: The Perils and Promise of a
Backward-Looking Jurisprudence, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at 209
(“The Principles strive to treat all families and intimate relationships on equal terms
and insist on few, if any, preconditions for the recognition of family relationships.”).
124 For example, illustration 9 to § 2.03 of the Principles involves a same-sex couple.
125 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, at 34 (“Other countries primarily ask the
question: Does this nonmarital family look like a marital family? If so, they apply some
or all of their family law to the dissolution of the nonmarital family. . . . Chapter 6
adopts this approach.”). For critiques of this approach, see, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott,
Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts and Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY, supra note 4, at 332; Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default
Rules, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at 269; Marsha Garrison, Marriage
Matters: What’s Wrong with the ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING
THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at 305.
126 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, § 4.11 (Division of Property Upon
Dissolution).
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rules apply to “domestic partners.”127 Moreover, all of the rules
apply equally without regard to the sex or sexual orientation of
the parties.128 For example, the rules in Chapter 6 regarding
property division between unmarried cohabitants apply to all
unmarried cohabitants—same-sex or different-sex—who fulfill
the relevant criteria.129
And, again, as stated above, the overarching theme of
the Principles is to elevate function over form when considering
whether the relationship of the parties is such that they should
be treated as a unit rather than as individuals. This premise
applies to both the economic provisions and to the provisions
regarding children. Thus, under both the custody and child
support provisions, there are a variety of circumstances where
a non-marital partner would have parental rights and/or
obligations even when he or she lacks a legal parent-child
relationship.130 And these rules apply equally to same-sex
couples. Same-sex couples are included in the Principles
without regard to their sexual orientation. If same-sex couples
are married, they are treated as a married couple. If same-sex
couples are unmarried, they are treated as “domestic partners”
provided they fulfill the relevant criteria.131 This result is not
an accident. The drafters explicitly chose to include same-sex
couples and to treat them equally.132
127 See, e.g., id. § 6.05 (“Domestic-partnership property should be divided
according to the principles set forth for the division of marital property[.]”).
128 See, e.g., id. at 34-35 (“Chapter 6 generally defines domestic partners as
‘two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a
significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.’”).
129 See, e.g., id. § 6.03 (defining “domestic partners” to mean “two persons of
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of
time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple”).
130 See, e.g., id. § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (providing that a person is a parent by estoppel
if he or she has “lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting
full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting
agreement with the child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with full
parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the
individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests”); id. § 3.03(1) (providing that a
court may impose child support on a person who is not a legal parent when the person’s
“prior course of affirmative conduct equitably estops that person from denying a
parental support obligation to the child”). For an insightful discussion of the tension or
lack of consistency between the child custody and child support standards, see
Katharine K. Baker, Asymmetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra
note 4, at 121.
131 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, § 6.03(1) (“For the purpose of defining
relationships to which this Chapter applies, domestic partners are two persons of the
same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time
share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.”).
132 See, e.g., id. (defining domestic partner to include couples of the “same or
opposite sex”).
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Again, while one may disagree with particular rules
adopted by the drafters, the drafters’ approach in thinking both
holistically and inclusively about the subject matter is
commendable, and it is the type of approach we hope will serve
as a model for future ALI projects.
D.

Examples of Needed LGBT Incorporation

As described above, there are examples of ALI
publications that, at least in some respects, have succeeded in
incorporating LGBT concerns. There are, however, other ALI
publications or parts of ALI publications that deserve more
consideration, reflection, and possibly revision. The Restatements
of Torts serve as good examples of such publications.133 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts took an approach reflective of the
time in which it was drafted. At the time of its adoption in 1965,
the Second Restatement did not include a single mention of
sexual orientation.134 The Restatement (Third) of Torts fares
somewhat better, as it includes LGBT issues and cases in some of
the Comments and Notes.135 But there is more work to be done.136
There are a number of provisions in the Restatements of
Torts that have a particular impact on LGBT individuals.
While others could be discussed, here we choose to limit
ourselves to three such areas: relational harms, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.137
1. Relational Torts
An obvious place for the consideration of LGBT issues is
relational torts, such as bystander emotional distress, loss of
133 There are many other publications that fall into this category. We discuss
the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS here because it is within our areas of expertise.
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). In more recent years, courts
have applied some of the Second Restatement provisions in LGBT contexts, as noted in
the Appendices to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS.
135 See infra Parts III.D.1–2.
136 Other scholars have explained how the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS fails to
adequately address concerns of race and gender. See, e.g., supra notes 24-28. In
addition to our concerns about the application of principles adopted by or advocated for
in ALI publications to LGBT people, as we discuss herein, we are also concerned about
their application to members of other marginalized groups, including women and
people of color.
137 The public duty doctrine is another such area of tort law. See, e.g., Brandon
v. Cnty. of Richardson, 566 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Neb. 1997) (finding an exception to the
public duty doctrine when a police officer failed to arrest a transgender rape victim’s
assailants and those assailants subsequently shot and killed the victim). The tort for
invasion of privacy is another. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 120, at 1711.
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consortium, and wrongful death. As noted earlier, a starting point
for creating a more LGBT-inclusive Restatement is to focus on
those provisions that rely on a marital or family relationship.138
We start by considering bystander recovery for negligently
inflicted emotional distress. The Third Restatement permits
recovery only to a percipient witness who suffers serious
emotional distress arising from the infliction of bodily harm to “a
close family member.”139 There has been ample litigation about
who constitutes a “close family member.”140 Persons in a close and
committed relationship short of legal marriage have largely
been unsuccessful in their efforts to recover for bystander
negligent infliction of emotional distress because most courts
have required proof of a legal marriage as a prerequisite to
recovery.141 Because gays and lesbians are prohibited from legal
marriage in most jurisdictions,142 the legal claims for bystander
emotional distress are foreclosed for most LGBT people.143 And,
See supra Part III.B.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 48
(2012). In so doing, the THIRD RESTATEMENT adopts something akin to the approach
taken by the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30
(Cal. 1989). In Thing, the court adopted the requirements that the claimant
contemporaneously perceive the harm-causing event and have a close family
relationship with the victim. Id. at 815. Many other jurisdictions have adopted a
similar approach. See, e.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 863 (Conn. 1996);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. f (2012).
Although the THIRD RESTATEMENT broadens recovery from that of its
predecessor, it continues to treat recovery for emotional harm more restrictively than
physical injury or even property damage. This more restrictive treatment of emotional
injury grows out of American tort law’s concerns about disproportionate liability and
feigned claims. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 160-61 (4th ed.
2010); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 821-24 (2000). While our focus is on
the Restatement’s impact on LGBT persons, it should be noted that a restrictive view
of emotional distress also negatively impacts other vulnerable and marginalized
groups. Women, for example, have been particularly harmed by the continuing
undervaluation of emotional injury. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women,
Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990); see also
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 27, at 92 (noting that although the “rules
governing emotional and relational harms are stated in gender-neutral terms, . . .
[they] tend[ ] to place women at a disadvantage because [these] important and
recurring injuries in women’s lives are more often classified as lower-ranked”).
140 See, e.g., Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655 (N.Y. 1993).
141 A typical example is Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656, 661-62 (Ind. 2007), in
which the Indiana Supreme Court refused to allow the victim’s fiancée to recover.
Similarly, in Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 1272 (1987), the court held that an
intimate same-sex relationship did not constitute a “close relationship” for purposes of
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress.
142 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
143 To date, only a few courts have permitted non-married cohabitants to
recover for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Paehl v.
Lincoln Cnty. Care Ctr., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254 (D.N.M. 2004); Graves v.
Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1262 (N.H. 2003) (permitting engaged different-sex
cohabitant to recover); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
138
139
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as noted above, the large and growing number of other nonmarital couples are also precluded from protection under this
standard.144 Moreover, and more importantly, as a few courts
have noted, requiring a marital relationship does not necessarily
do a good job of identifying the people who are most harmed.145
The
current
Third
Restatement
forthrightly
acknowledges that there is an ongoing debate about the
definition of “family” as it applies to bystander emotional distress
recovery.146 To their credit, the drafters encouraged jurisdictions
to “take into account changing practices and social norms and
employ a functional approach to determine what constitutes a
family.”147 Indeed, in urging a “functional approach” to the
definition of “close family member,” the drafters hinted at their
support for permitting those “living together in a stable, mutually
supportive, and emotionally dependent relationship” to be
included within the definition of family.148 As for LGBT couples
specifically, Comment f cites two references that favor a broader
and LGBT-inclusive vision of family: a 2010 New York Times
article149 and the book Counted Out: Same-Sex Relations and
Americans’ Definitions of Family.150
A more overtly inclusive approach, however, is called
for; one that is not based on a formal legal status, but instead
is based on a variety of functional criteria. The recognition of
the debate and the citation to some authority that supports the
broadening of recovery to include some same-sex couples151 is a
far cry from outright adoption of that position.152 In our view,
the Restatement missed an important opportunity. Because of
the influence of the Restatements of Torts,153 the adoption of an
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text. For a thoughtful and
comprehensive analysis of marriage requirements, see POLIKOFF, supra note 69, at 2-5, 123.
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48
cmt. f (2012).
147 Id. (“[T]his Section does require that the person seeking recovery be a close
family member, howsoever defined by the jurisdiction[.]”).
148 Id. (citing a few of the cases that permit non-married individuals to recover
for bystander emotional distress recovery).
149 Sam Roberts, Study Finds Wider View of “Family,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2010, at A.14.
150 BRIAN POWELL ET AL., COUNTED OUT: SAME-SEX RELATIONS AND
AMERICANS’ DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY 13-15 (2010).
151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 48 cmt. f (2012).
152 Cf. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 27, at 18 (“Even when the
Restatement explicitly ventures ‘no opinion’ on a particular aspect of doctrine . . . it
cannot be taken at face value. Instead, such a disclaimer may be implicitly expressing
the normative judgment that the matter is not of sufficient importance to justify taking
a position.”).
153 See supra Part II.
144
145
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explicit position of inclusion would have gone a long way
toward influencing legal developments regarding bystander
emotional distress claims by gays and lesbians, as well as other
non-marital couples.154
We recognize that taking a position advocating an
expansion of what constitutes a “close family relationship”
engenders debate not only about the propriety of including
gay and lesbian couples, but also about how to determine
which non-marital couples should be allowed to recover for
bystander emotional distress. Because some courts are deeply
concerned about expansive liability for bystander emotional
distress, they have adopted bright-line, marriage-based
limitations on recovery.155
The adoption by courts or by the ALI itself of a more
inclusive, functional approach would not be unprecedented.
Although it is certainly a minority position, some courts have
permitted unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples in
committed relationships to recover for bystander emotional
distress.156 Indeed, almost 20 years ago, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized that the “family relationship”
required for bystander emotional distress recovery extends
beyond relationships of legal marriage, noting:
An intimate familial relationship that is stable, enduring,
substantial, and mutually supportive is one that is cemented by
strong emotional bonds and provides a deep and pervasive emotional
security. We are satisfied that persons who enjoy such an intimate
familial relationship have a cognizable interest in the continued
mutual emotional well-being derived from their relationship.157

And the ALI itself has already endorsed a similar, more
flexible and functional understanding of family in its Principles
154 In author Levine’s conversation with Reporter Michael Green regarding
this section, Green acknowledged that while the reporters should act with restraint
and humility, the drafters could have taken the position that same-sex committed
couples constitute a “close family member[ ] ” for purposes of bystander negligent
infliction of emotional distress. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. As
Reporter Green noted, none of the ALI members (including author Levine) actually
advocated that such a position be taken. Absent such pressure, restraint by the
reporters seemed appropriate. Interview with Michael Green, supra note 112.
155 See, e.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 863 (Conn. 1996); Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
156 See, e.g., Paehl v. Lincoln Cnty. Care Ctr., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254
(D.N.M. 2004); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1262 (N.H. 2003) (permitting engaged
different-sex cohabitant to recover); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
157 Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380. See generally Green, supra note 108, at 1093
(advocating that the legal status of the parties should be only one of several factors in
determining who may recover for bystander emotional distress).
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of the Law of Family Dissolution.158 Specifically, rather than
relying solely on formal legal relationships created under state
law, the Principles also uses multi-factor, functional tests to
determine whether the parent-child relationship159 or the adultadult relationship160 is entitled to protection. For example, to
decide whether parties are entitled to protections as “domestic
partners,” courts are instructed to consider a range of functional
criteria, including how long they have lived together, whether
they have a child in common, oral or written promises they have
made to each other, and the extent of intermingling of their
finances.161 The Restatement (Third) of Torts could have—and
should have—adopted this more flexible and modern position.
The tort of loss of consortium—providing recovery for
the loss of comfort, companionship, and access to sexual
relations162—raises similar issues of exclusion.163 Here, too,
LGBT individuals and other unmarried couples largely have
been barred from recovery due to the lack of legal recognition of
their relationships.164 A more inclusive approach, one that is
based on the nature rather than the legal form of the
relationship, is in order.165
Broadening the types of familial relationships entitled
to legal recovery may be the most challenging in the context of
wrongful death. State statutes dictate which family members
158 PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, at 33 (“As the incidence of cohabitation has
dramatically increased and cohabitation has become socially acceptable at all levels of
society, it has become increasingly implausible to attribute special significance to the
parties’ failure to marry.”).
159 Id. § 2.03.
160 Id. § 6.03.
161 Id.
162 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 139, at 160.
163 For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1977) limits
recovery for loss of consortium to “spouse[s].” Section 693 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS provides that “[o]ne who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable
to one spouse for illness or other bodily harm is subject to liability to the other spouse
for the resulting loss of the society and services of the first spouse.” Id. § 693(1).
164 Typical of the approach taken by most courts is that of the Florida
Appellate Court in Bashaway v. Cheney Bros., Inc., in which the court refused the
plaintiff ’ s loss of consortium claim despite uncontroverted evidence of an exclusive and
long-term, committed lesbian relationship with the tortiously injured party. 987 So. 2d
93, 96 (Fla. App. 2008). The court reached this result despite a history of expansion of
consortium rights in the state of Florida. Id. at 94; see also, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 33
A.3d 814, 818 (Conn. App. 2011). Professor Culhane suggests that courts have been
particularly resistant to expanding the scope of loss of consortium claims to unmarried
persons because sexual intimacy of the relationship is a key component of the damages.
John G. Culhane, A “Clanging Silence”: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J.
911, 950 (2001).
165 Again, this approach would not be unprecedented. See, e.g., Lozoya v.
Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 961 (N.M. 2003) (allowing persons with intimate familial
relationships with the injured party to recovery for loss of consortium).
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may bring a wrongful death claim. As is true with the other
relational torts discussed above, those in non-marital
relationships who suffer the economic and emotional harm of the
death of a partner are unable to recover in most jurisdictions.166
Thus, it remains the case that in the majority of jurisdictions,
LGBT people will not be able to recover under this standard.167
The Restatement should urge states to adopt a more flexible
standard for assessing who is entitled to sue for wrongful death.168
As the ALI recognizes in the Principles,169 in at least
some contexts, using marriage as a bright-line prerequisite for
important rights and protections is no longer consistent with the
realities of contemporary family life. It often unfairly denies
recognition of, and protection to, functionally equivalent
relationships, and it is inconsistent with the trajectory of the
law. Accordingly, these relational torts are examples of
provisions in which the ALI should urge the deviation from the
current majority rule.
2. Other Torts
Although torts involving relational injury are those that
most directly cry out for revision, there are other areas of tort
law that affect the lives of LGBT individuals in ways worthy of
inclusion in any effort to restate the law of torts. These areas
tend to be provisions that can, in some cases, turn on a right to
recover for discriminatory conduct. Here, we note two of the
many areas where the current or future Restatements of the law
of torts should consider the impact of the law on LGBT
individuals: intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation. These examples are intended to be illustrative, not
exhaustive; the complete list of provisions in need of
reconsideration would be more extensive.
In these areas, there are two overriding concerns that
reformers should bear in mind. First, there is a concern about
whether people who experience harm based on real or perceived
166 John G. Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from
Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 174 (2005); see also, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s
Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), rev’g 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2003), appeal dismissed, 817 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (denying
recovery for a civil union spouse); Raum v. Rest. Assocs., Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 348
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (denying recovery for a nonmarital partner).
167 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
168 The California legislature, for example, expanded the coverage of the
state’s wrongful death statute to include those in registered domestic partnerships.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2013).
169 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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sexual orientation or gender identity receive equal treatment as
compared to people who experience harm based on other identity
characteristics. Second, there is also a more general concern
about whether tort law provides adequate relief for, and
recognition of, the harm caused by such conduct.
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Restatement (Third) of Torts’ treatment of
intentional infliction of emotional distress largely fares well on
the first concern regarding similar treatment, but may require
more consideration with regard to whether it provides
adequate relief.
The Third Restatement’s treatment of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, at least implicitly, integrates
LGBT issues in a manner similar to that which we advocate
here. At various places, the drafters include cases that involve
LGBT individuals seeking to recover for their emotional injury.170
Further, the intentional infliction of emotional distress section
implicitly suggests that the claims of LGBT plaintiffs should be
treated similarly to the claims of women and people of color.171
The ALI takes a step in the right direction by implicitly
suggesting that these forms of biased treatment should be
treated similarly. The drafters, however, should go further and
include a clearer statement to help ensure that state tort law
comports with such an inclusive approach.172
Although the provision addresses adequately the equality
concern, the high standard adopted by the Restatement may
170 The Notes in Section 46 cite Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d
604 (Neb. 2001), in which the court found that a police officer’s brutal questioning of a
transgender sexual assault victim was extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 46 cmt. d (2012).
Further, Comment j includes a reference to a case in which a supervisor’s sexualorientation based verbal attack was deemed extreme and outrageous, although the
plaintiff ultimately lost the claim because the court did not find the injury sufficiently
severe to justify a claim for IIED. Id. § 46 cmt. j.
171 Id.
172 There is one aspect of the new Section 46 that is of concern, however, for
reasons similar to those discussed in Part III.D.1. Like the SECOND RESTATEMENT, the
THIRD RESTATEMENT grapples with the issue of third party recovery for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The THIRD RESTATEMENT limits recovery for emotional
harm to “bystanders” who are “close family members and who contemporaneously
perceive the event.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 cmt. m (2012) (suggesting that the spousal limitation is “justified by the
generalization that the harmed person’s close family members are more likely to suffer
severe emotional harm than are strangers or acquaintances”). By so doing, the same
concerns raised with regard to other relational torts are implicated. We advocate a
similar inclusive approach here.
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wrongly bar some worthy claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Third Restatement largely adopts its
predecessor’s approach. Thus, to be actionable, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in
extreme and outrageous behavior that caused severe emotional
distress.173 The Third Restatement defines “extreme and
outrageous conduct” as conduct that “goes beyond the bounds of
human decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable in
a civilized community.”174 The drafters of this section made clear
that this standard (along with the requirement of proof of severe
emotional distress) is designed to create a high threshold for
recovery.175 By noting that “ordinary insults and indignities are
not enough for liability to be imposed” for intentional infliction of
emotional distress,176 the Third Restatement continues to adhere
to the traditional approach where even the worst kinds of insults
are deemed inadequate for recovery because such bad behavior is
just a part of our culture to which people need to adjust.177
Indeed, under the Third Restatement’s approach, even
racist, sexist, and homophobic insults—hate speech designed to
harm the recipient’s psyche by reinforcing a history of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012).
Id. § 46 cmt. d (2012); see also, e.g., Lewis v. Schmidt Baking Co., Inc., 16
F.3d 614, 615 (4th Cir. 1994).
175 In fact, the THIRD RESTATEMENT in Section 46 repeatedly advocates that
judges play a particularly active gatekeeping function regarding this “extreme and
outrageous” standard in order to prevent the tort “from being so broad as to intrude on
important countervailing policies,” such as the freedom of speech. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012); see also MacDermid v.
Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 732 (6th Cir. 2007) (“‘[T]he outrageousness
requirement is an ‘exacting standard’’”); DAN DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 48 (2d
ed. 2011).
176 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt.
d (2012).
177 See, e.g., Brown v. Zaveri, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(denying recovery to African-American plaintiff when a manager of McDonald’s refused
to serve him and hurled hateful racist epithets at him because the conduct was not
extreme and outrageous as a matter of law); see also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted
Hate Speech and the First Amendment: How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided
Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 45, 75 (2013) (“Because of the restricted nature of IIED,
the burden imposed on expression by subjecting speakers to tort liability for targeted
hate speech is minimal.”).
The THIRD RESTATEMENT recognizes that even within its narrow view of
what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct, particularly hateful insults may
give rise to liability when they were launched by a person in a position of power against
someone in a subordinate or dependent position (such as a supervisor against an
employee or a police officer against a crime victim). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. d (2012). The drafters acknowledge that sexual
orientation-based insults may give rise to liability in the abuse of authority context just like
other forms of particularly hateful speech although, again, the THIRD RESTATEMENT so
provides only implicitly by citing to two cases raising this issue. Id.; id. § 46 cmt. j. Again,
ideally, Section 46 of the THIRD RESTATEMENT would have made this clearer.
173
174
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subjugation and mistreatment178—are seen as just a part of our
culture that traditionally mistreated and particularly
vulnerable persons simply have to accept.179 This approach
ignores the well-documented harmful effects of discriminatory
hate speech.180
The Restatement could have adopted an aspirational
standard of what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct.
That is, the drafters could have chosen not to use a test that
accepts boorish and mean-spirited behavior as the norm.
Powerful arguments have been made that liability under a
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress181 or a new
intentional tort182 should be imposed on at least some forms of
hate speech and other discriminatory conduct. And as we noted
above, in some circumstances, it is appropriate for the
Restatements to depart from the majority approach and to
state the law as it should be rather than as it is.183 This may be
one area of law in which further consideration and reflection is
warranted.184

178 See, e.g., Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage, supra note 25, at 2127
(“For the most part, courts do not equate discrimination with outrageous conduct . . . .
[C]ourts have refused to classify discrimination as per se outrageous and have even
hesitated to declare the ‘severe’ or ‘pervasive’ harassment required to prove a Title VII
claim of hostile environment sufficient to satisfy the threshold tort requirement of
‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Leslie Bender,
Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 115,
147 (1994) (“[F]ew cases ever seem to meet the threshold of extreme and outrageous
conduct necessary for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. . . . Rarely are
these issues addressed so directly in a judicial opinion; . . . gender matters and affects
how, when and why the court finds causes of action to exist.” (footnotes omitted)).
179 Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 124 (Ala. 1985) (holding
that “[i]n order to create a cause of action, the conduct must be such that would cause
mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities, not
conduct which would be considered unacceptable merely by homosexuals”).
180 See,
e.g., Ronald Turner, Regulating Hate Speech and the First
Amendment: The Attractions of, and Objections to, an Explicit Harms-Based Analysis,
29 IND. L. REV. 257, 293-98 (1995) (laying out the many harms of hate speech).
181 See, e.g., Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 159 (1990); see also
Okainer Christian Dark, Racial Insults: “Keep Thy Tongue From Evil,” 24 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 559, 562 (1990).
182 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 181 (1982); Mari
J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, in MATSUDA
ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND 17, 34-35 (1993); cf. Julie Seaman, Hate Speech and Identity
Politics: A Situationalist Proposal, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 103-05 (2008).
183 See supra Part III.A.
184 Indeed, as Professor Chamallas explains, “the tort of [IIED] has been kneedeep in issues relating to gender, sexuality, and personal morality” since its creation.
Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage, supra note 25, at 2121.

658

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:2

b. Defamation
Currently, there is no Restatement of Torts project that
seeks to review the complex law of defamation. But if and when
such a project is undertaken, there will be an opportunity to
clarify one of the most complex and confused areas of American
tort law.185 This undertaking would also provide an opportunity
for the drafters to ensure that anti-LGBT conduct is treated
similarly to other forms of discriminatory conduct.186 Consistent
with the way the law has evolved with regard to race and
ethnicity, the drafters could clarify that false imputations that
a person is LGBT should no longer be considered defamatory.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “[a]
communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him.”187 The Second Restatement further provides
that the harm to the plaintiff’s reputation must be “in the eyes
of a substantial and respectable minority,”188 a position adopted
by many courts.189 Other courts use a similar concept and
require that the plaintiff’s reputation be harmed in the eyes of
a “right-thinking” person.190 Regardless of which test a
jurisdiction applies, a statement that lowers the reputation of

185 Defamation law is particularly complex because of the conflict between its
original goal of making it easy to recover for reputational harm and the countervailing
First Amendment concerns of protecting the freedom of speech and of the press raised
by permitting such an easy recovery. Also, there have been several significant opinions
by the United States Supreme Court that have altered defamation law mightily since
the Restatement last dealt with the issue in 1977. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 139,
at 356; RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5.26 (2d ed. 2003).
186 This issue has engendered substantial scholarly commentary. See generally
Matthew D. Bunker et al., Not That There’s Anything Wrong with That: Imputations of
Homosexuality and the Normative Structure of Defamation Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 581, 601 (2011); see also Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of
Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 527, 542 (2012); Robert D. Richards, Gay Labeling and
Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Changed Enough to Modify
Reputational Torts?, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349, 356, 368-69 (2010); Haven Ward,
“I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”: Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual be Defamatory?,
44 GA. L. REV. 739, 766 (2010).
187 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
188 Id. § 559 cmt. e.
189 See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1009 (Utah 1994).
190 See, e.g., Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996); DIAMOND ET
AL., supra note 139, at 357-58.
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the plaintiff only among some bigoted or otherwise largely antisocial group is not actionable.191
The concept of what is defamatory has evolved over
time. Based on the “right-thinking” or “respectable minority”
approach, what is considered defamatory changes based on such
things as “the temper of the times [and] the current of
contemporary public opinion.”192 With the passage of time and the
development of more tolerant attitudes, communications assumed
to be defamatory in the past no longer sustain a claim for
defamation. Thus, it is now well-settled that a false statement that
a Caucasian person is African-American or of mixed-race cannot be
found to be defamatory even though it was in the past.193
The ALI should make clear that the result should be the
same with regard to false assertions that a person is gay or
lesbian. Although to date no court has expressly determined
that a false imputation of homosexuality can never be
defamatory, some recent court decisions have moved in that
direction.194 Further, in light of both cultural and constitutional
law developments, it is hard to justify a rule that permits a
false imputation of LGBT status to be defamatory.
In the years both before and directly after Bowers v.
Hardwick,195 courts often concluded that false imputations of
homosexuality were defamatory per se196 because most states had
criminalized private, consensual same-sex sexual conduct.197 But
the legal and cultural landscape has changed significantly over
the last decade. Bowers was forcefully overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas.198 Lawrence struck down the “dozen or so . . . sodomy
laws that still existed . . . in the country” and recognized the
191 See, e.g., DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 139, at 358 (“If the group that could
interpret the communication in a way that injures the plaintiff ’ s reputation is
blatantly anti-social, courts may deny the plaintiff a defamation action.”).
192 Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Mencher
v. Chesley, 75 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1947)).
193 SMOLLA, supra note 185, at § 4:6; see also Anthony Michael Kreis,
Lawrence Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation
Defamation, 122 YALE L. J. ONLINE 125, 134 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/11/
12/kreis.html; Ward, supra note 186, at 749-50.
194 See, e.g, Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D. Mass. 2004).
195 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
196 Communications classified as “defamat[ory] per se” are considered so
noxious that reputational harm damages are presumed and plaintiffs are relieved of
the obligation of proving economic losses flowing from the defamation as a prerequisite
to recovering for reputational harm. Barth, supra note 186, at 531.
197 See, e.g., Manale v. City of New Orleans Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122, 125
(5th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with trial court’s finding that falsely calling someone gay was
defamatory per se); see also Barth, supra note 186, at 532-34 (discussing cases); Ward,
supra note 186, at 753-55 (same).
198 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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dignity and right to equal treatment “of homosexual
persons.”199 As of January 2014, 17 states and the District of
Columbia permit or soon will permit same-sex couples to
marry.200 Likewise, public attitudes about gays and lesbians
have shifted dramatically.201
Consistent with these changes, a number of courts have
recently rejected defamation claims brought by people who
were falsely accused of being LGBT. In 2004, for example, a
federal district court reasoned that in light of Massachusetts’
broad nondiscrimination protections for LGBT individuals and
the state’s expansion of marriage rights to include same-sex
couples, false imputations of sexual orientation were not
defamatory per se.202 As the court explained: “If we were to agree
that calling someone a homosexual is defamatory per se—it
would, in effect, validate the sentiment and legitimize relegating
homosexuals to second-class status.”203 Even more recently, a New
York appellate court refused to follow precedent that had
established that false imputations of homosexuality were
defamatory per se, reasoning that to do so would have wrongly
suggested that there was something shameful or disgraceful
about being gay, lesbian, or bisexual.204
Levine, supra note 41, at 10-11.
Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
201 See Jeffery M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in
U.S., GALLUP (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-supportsolidifies-above.aspx (“Just three years ago, support for gay marriage was 44%. The
current 53% level of support is essentially double the 27% in Gallup’s initial
measurement on gay marriage, in 1996.”); Susan Page, Attitudes Toward Gays
Changing Fast, Poll Finds, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2012, at A.1; Pew Research Center, In
Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as
‘Inevitable’ (June 6, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/in-gay-marriagedebate-both-supporters-and-opponents-see-legal-recognition-as-inevitable/ (“For the
first time in Pew Research Center polling, just over half (51%) of Americans favor
allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally.”).
202 Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D. Mass. 2004) (“Looking at
any ‘considerable and respectable class of the community’ in this day and age, I cannot
conclude that identifying someone as a homosexual discredits him, that the statement
fits within the category of defamation per se.”).
203 Id. at 138; see also Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp., No. 08-1742, 2010
WL 1372408, at *7 (D.N.J. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011)
(dismissing a sexual orientation-based defamation action because the court concluded
that “it appears unlikely that the New Jersey Supreme Court would legitimize
discrimination against [LGBT persons] by concluding that referring to someone as
homosexual” was defamatory).
204 Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). These
courts rejected a per se categorization of sexual-orientation based defamation but did
not go as far as to determine that such communications could never be defamatory.
Although courts are moving away from the per se classification regarding false
imputations of homosexuality, one author contends that a per se classification should
remain given the pervasive anti-LGBT bias in parts of society. Richards, supra note
186, at 362, 365-68, 374; see also Ward, supra note 186, at 763 (“[C]ourts finding the
199
200

2014]

RESTATEMENT OF GAY(?)

661

If and when the ALI revisits the tort of defamation, the
ALI should explicitly endorse the emerging trend in the case
law and make clear that, as is true for false imputations of
race, false imputations of homosexuality should not give rise to
a cognizable defamation claim. A determination that sexualorientation defamation cannot be actionable would be a
substantial step toward recognizing the dignity of the LGBT
community.205
CONCLUSION
The ALI makes itself more influential and relevant
when it deliberately and comprehensively takes steps to ensure
that its publications keep up with changes in the law. This is
no less true with regard to LGBT issues. Incorporating LGBT
issues into all existing and future ALI publications would be
entirely consistent with the purpose of the ALI, as the ALI was
founded to modernize our concepts of “the law.”206 Indeed, as
stated in its Certificate of Incorporation, part of the ALI’s mission
is to ensure the law’s “better adaptation to social needs.”207
As we have explained above, the most appropriate way
to grapple with LGBT legal issues is through an inclusive
rather than an exclusive approach. That is, rather than
attempting to address LGBT issues through a separate, standalone publication, we urge the ALI to be mindful of how any and
all of its provisions apply to LGBT people. Moreover, given the
speed of evolution in this area of the law, when undertaking this
inclusive revision, these provisions will often call for a more
reformist rather than a static approach to drafting.

false imputation of homosexuality defamatory amounts to a judicial pronouncement
that homophobic views are worthy of the law’s respect, thereby validating and
endorsing homophobia. In so finding the courts effectively legally sanction
homophobia.” (footnotes omitted)).
Indeed, in light of constitutional developments, it may no longer be
permissible for courts to permit these defamation cases in which the legal process is
being used to further private biases. Kreis, supra note 193, at 138-39 (“[W]henever
courts permit sexual-orientation defamation suits, they entangle themselves with antiLGBT animus in precisely the way that the Supreme Court has tried to prohibit.”).
205 By the time the topic of defamation is revisited by the ALI, it is likely that
some courts will have adopted the position we advocate. Moreover, to the extent that
some courts are still lagging behind, it is not unprecedented for the ALI to lead the
way. The ALI has done this before, and will surely do so again in other contexts when
there are “powerful reasons” to do so. Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 294.
206 Id. at 283-84.
207 Michael
Greenwald, The American Law Institute Simplification
Experience, 105 DICK. L. REV. 225, 225 (2001).
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Further, this inclusive approach would not be a new path
for the ALI. Over half a century ago, the ALI took bold steps to
advocate for the reform of the law in ways that positively affected
LGBT individuals.208 We think that such an undertaking would
prove very worthwhile and important. Keeping up to date with
the evolution of the law is critical to the ALI’s continued influence
and relevance. And, if undertaken, the approach we propose has
the potential to positively impact the development of the law. We
hope it is one that the ALI embraces.

208 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing how the MPC’s treatment of private,
consensual sodomy was in many aspects a major departure from existing law in a way
that was protective of LGBT rights).

